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FEDERAL JURISDICTION ACCORDING TO 
PROFESSOR FRANKFURTER 
EVAN TSEN LEE* 
 The birth of the modern course in “Federal Courts” or “Federal 
Jurisdiction” is usually traced to the publication in 1953 of Henry M. Hart and 
Herbert Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System.1  I do not 
wish to depreciate the magisterial accomplishment of that volume in any way.  
In this review, however, I examine a casebook that was the intellectual 
forebear of Hart and Wechsler: Felix Frankfurter and Wilber G. Katz,2 Cases 
and Other Authorities on Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure (1931).  I hope 
this look back will provide an interesting perspective on the future of the 
course. 
I 
Felix Frankfurter was born in Vienna in 1882, the third of six children.3  
His father, Leopold, was a rather ineffectual man, a romantic and connoisseur 
of the finer things in life, but a guileless and slightly indolent businessman who 
could barely keep the family financially afloat in the rough economic waters of 
late nineteenth century Vienna.4  His mother Emma was stouter and more 
practical, pushing the boys toward education, directing them away from their 
ne’er-do-well father5 and toward their Uncle Solomon, a highly accomplished 
 
* Professor, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.  A portion of this essay was 
taken from my forthcoming book, tentatively titled, THE STORY OF STANDING: THE LIFE AND 
TIMES OF JUDICIAL RESTRAINT IN AMERICA (Oxford University Press). 
 1. HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM (1st ed. 1953). 
 2. In 1931 Wilber Katz had just started a long career on the faculty of the University of 
Chicago Law School, where he would eventually serve as Dean.  Professor Katz Retires, THE 
GARGOYLE:  ALUMNI BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN LAW SCHOOL, Spring 1970, 
at v.  He received his LL.B. and S.J.D. degrees from Harvard.  Id.  His fields of expertise were 
corporations and church-state relations.  See id. 
 3. MICHAEL E. PARRISH, FELIX FRANKFURTER AND HIS TIMES:  THE REFORM YEARS 7, 8 
(1982). 
 4. See id. at 8. 
 5. Id. at 12. 
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scholar who was appointed director of the state library.6  Young Felix 
particularly admired that Solomon had become “a spokesman for Jewish 
interests in the city and a shtadlan (backstairs petitioner) with the gentile 
power structure.”7  In 1894, Emma reluctantly packed up the children and 
followed Leopold to New York, where he sought to start afresh.8 
The Frankfurters settled on the predominantly Jewish Lower East Side.9  In 
his comprehensive biography of Frankfurter’s pre-Court years, Michael Parrish 
documents how the Frankfurters “settled initially on Seventh Street, near 
Tompkins Square and Cooper Union, in the heavily German-speaking 
neighborhood where the sober residents voted Republican, admired their 
wealthy coreligionists—the Seligmans, Warburgs, and Strauses—and hoped to 
maintain a comfortable distance from the boisterous, Yiddish-speaking masses 
on Henry and Cherry Streets.”10  The German Jews on the Lower East Side 
were attracted to gentility, which carried with it a certain social conservatism 
and respect for pedigreed institutions and practices; the Eastern European Jews 
were generally poorer, more ideological, more political, more devout, and 
often more radical.11  Young Felix adopted the values of the German Jewish 
community pretty much down the line, with one glaring exception—like his 
Uncle Solomon, he loved politics.12 
Though he struggled to understand the devoutness of the Eastern 
Europeans—to his mother’s eternal consternation, Felix had inherited his 
father’s agnosticism—he found the Eastern Europeans intellectually 
fascinating.13  At City College, Frankfurter had his first real exposure to these 
idealistic and bohemian thinkers, whose “conversations often turned to 
anarchism, revolution, Emma Goldman, dialectical materialism, and free 
love.”14  This was a far cry from the German-Jewish students whose company 
he usually kept, immersed in their quest for respectability and personal 
achievement.15  Frankfurter could see the virtues and vices on both sides, and 
throughout his career he sought to marry the passion for justice and social 
change with a profound respect for history and institutions.  It eventually led 
him to forsake the dreamier professions of journalist or poet in favor of 
becoming a reform-minded lawyer.16 
 
 6. Id. at 9, 12. 
 7. Id. at 9. 
 8. PARRISH, supra note 3, at 9. 
 9. Id. at 11. 
 10. Id. at 9. 
 11. Id. at 11, 15. 
 12. Id. at 13. 
 13. PARRISH, supra note 3, at 15–16. 
 14. Id. at 15. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 16. 
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First, however, there was the matter of legal training.  After two brief stints 
in night classes at local schools, which he found dull, Frankfurter enrolled at 
Harvard Law School in the fall of 1902.17  There, “[i]n high-ceilinged Austin 
Hall, . . . the waistcoated doyens of the legal profession—James Barr Ames, 
Samuel Williston, John Chipman Gray, Joseph Doddridge Brannan, and 
Joseph Henry Beale—attempted to make gentlemen and lawyers out of the 
scions of the Anglo-Saxon establishment and a handful of immigrants.”18 
Among these faculty members, Gray was a strong influence.19  He hired 
Frankfurter as a research assistant.20  Frankfurter undoubtedly read Gray’s The 
Nature and Sources of the Law,21 which rejected the jurisprudence of natural 
rights “in favor of a pragmatic interpretation of the origin of legal rules that 
located them in the shifting configurations of social life and the varying 
responses of judges to these changing circumstances.”22  Like his friend 
Holmes, Gray had breathed the deep skepticism that led both of them to scorn 
Langdell’s orthodoxy and Brewer’s and Sutherland’s views of natural rights.23 
Frankfurter would develop a habit of personal adulation for and loyalty to 
certain figures (Holmes, Brandeis, and Franklin Roosevelt), but his absorption 
of the ideas of James Bradley Thayer cannot be attributed to a personal 
relationship between the two.  Thayer died the year Frankfurter got to 
Harvard.24  Yet, according to Parrish, “Thayer had a profound influence upon 
Frankfurter, who read [his paper] ‘The Origin and Scope of the American 
Doctrine of Constitutional Law’ so many times that he could recite whole 
passages from memory.”25  Thayer’s rule of “clear error” became a cornerstone 
of Frankfurter’s professional indoctrination.26  He held this belief uncritically, 
as a first principle of American constitutionalism, in need of no justification.  
“Above all,” wrote Parrish, “he wished to promote the ideal of judicial restraint 
in the tradition of Thayer and Holmes.  Judges, he believed, should not 
substitute their own policy choices for those of the popular branches.”27 
It was not only this abstract commitment to judicial restraint that drove 
Frankfurter.  There was a strong instrumental motivation as well: as a 
 
 17. Id. 
 18. PARRISH, supra note 3, at 16–17. 
 19. Id. at 20. 
 20. Id. at 19. 
 21. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW (Roland Gray ed., 2d 
ed. 1931). 
 22. PARRISH, supra note 3, at 20. 
 23. Id. at 17, 20. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 21. 
 26. See, e.g., Felix Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1002, 
1007–08 (1923). 
 27. PARRISH, supra note 3, at 65. 
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consistent advocate of reform, he understood that it was courts, and federal 
courts in particular, that stood in the way.28  Although Frankfurter had long 
been critical of the use of the diversity jurisdiction and substantive due process 
to foil progressive reform legislation, it was the 1923 decision of Adkins v. 
Children’s Hospital29 that really stuck in his craw.30  The hospital challenged 
the District of Columbia’s minimum wage law for women, alleging that it 
violated the principle of liberty of contract as enunciated in the substantive due 
process decisions.  Frankfurter defended the statute before the Supreme 
Court.31  In the wake of cases like Muller v. Oregon,32 McLean v. Arkansas,33 
and Bunting v. Oregon34 (which he had argued successfully), Frankfurter was 
confident that the tide against wage and hour legislation had turned for good.35  
But Justice Sutherland, quoting wholesale from Lochner v. New York,36 
distinguished the wage law sub judice from the hours legislation in Muller and 
Bunting.37  (Even Taft dissented, though he could not bring himself to join 
Holmes’s characteristically blunt opinion.  Brandeis recused himself.)  
Stunned, Frankfurter came to the conclusion that the Court had to be forcibly 
removed from the business of reviewing such legislation.  “The whole thing we 
thought gained in 1912 is now thrown overboard and we are just where we 
were” he wrote to Learned Hand.38  “I confess I did not expect it again.”39  
Shortly thereafter, in the pages of The New Republic, he advocated the repeal 
of the Due Process Clause.40 
Frankfurter’s zeal for judicial restraint grew out of the combination of deep 
professional indoctrination and longstanding political frustration.  As Parrish 
summed it up, Frankfurter believed that the Constitution “permitted vigorous, 
effective government and social experimentation.”41  He wanted to give the 
legislature more latitude than even Holmes or Brandeis did.42  He disapproved 
of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,43 in which Holmes’s majority opinion 
struck down a statute aimed at protecting dwellings from improvident mining 
 
 28. Id. at 21–22. 
 29. 261 U.S. 525 (1923). 
 30. PARRISH, supra note 3, at 165. 
 31. Id. 
 32. 208 U.S. 412 (1908). 
 33. 211 U.S. 539 (1909). 
 34. 243 U.S. 426 (1917). 
 35. See PARRISH, supra note 3, at 165. 
 36. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 37. Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 548–54 (1923). 
 38. PARRISH, supra note 3, at 165. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 167. 
 42. Id. at 166. 
 43. 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922). 
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activity.  And he criticized Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial 
Relations,44 which struck down a Kansas scheme that authorized compulsory 
arbitration and price-fixing.  Holmes and Brandeis had gone along with that 
one.45  Frankfurter wrote: “Thus fails another social experiment . . . not 
because it has been tried and found wanting, but because it has been tried and 
found unconstitutional.”46  It was this almost unremittingly negative attitude 
toward judicial review that Frankfurter took into his Federal Jurisdiction 
casebook. 
II 
Cases and Other Authorities on Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure47 was 
not just another book treating federal practice as a set of purely technical 
requirements, viewed entirely from the standpoint of the lawyer trying to 
negotiate the procedural labyrinth on behalf of his client.  Instead, it viewed the 
subject from the standpoint of a statesman or social engineer, prodding the 
reader to think about how the federal courts could best contribute to the 
advancement of the polity.  The book’s introduction is worth recounting at 
some length: 
[T]he historic experience subsumed under the phrase “federal jurisdiction and 
procedure” is not merely an account of the technical regulation of the business 
of administering law through the courts.  The particular system of courts with 
which we are concerned, unlike other courts, serves a special political purpose.  
The federal judiciary is one of the most powerful means for achieving the 
adjustments upon which the success of a federated nation rests.  Federal 
jurisdiction is thus an important part of the public law of the United States.  
That the interaction between the political power of states and central 
government is conveyed, as it often is, through nice questions of judicial 
competence and procedure only adds zest to the exploration of such issues, and 
for their solution demands the statesman’s gift of imagination as well as the 
disciplined training of the lawyer.48 
In a sense, Frankfurter and Katz found a litigant-centered course on federal 
practice and turned it into a course on the federal judicial role in American 
political structure, viewed from an Olympian systemic perspective.  Of course, 
this is too grandiose a statement; it is hard to see how venue, for example, 
affects political structure.  It is nonetheless true that the editors passed over 
several important federal jurisdictional specialties—admiralty, bankruptcy, 
 
 44. 262 U.S. 522, 544 (1923). 
 45. PARRISH, supra note 3, at 167. 
 46. Id. 
 47. FELIX FRANKFURTER & WILBER G. KATZ, CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON 
FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE (1931). 
 48. Id. at vi–vii. 
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federal criminal law, Indian land litigation, patents—because they were too 
“specialized,” and as such, lay at the periphery of the structural dynamic.49  On 
the other hand, review of decisions of the Supreme Court of the Philippine 
Islands merited inclusion, as Frankfurter’s experience in Teddy Roosevelt’s 
War Department convinced him of the topic’s political importance.50 
Of the casebook’s 732 pages (not including tables and appendices), the 
first 125 are devoted to a chapter entitled “Constitutional Limits of the Judicial 
Power—‘Case or Controversy.’”  The chapter begins with the prohibition on 
advisory opinions (Hayburn’s Case51 and Gordon v. United States52), then 
moves to the question of what matters were presented in a sufficiently judicial 
form for adjudication (Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson,53 Old 
Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner,54 Muskrat v. United States,55 and the 
“Correspondence of the Justices”56).  The chapter then discusses “case or 
controversy” problems associated with injunctions against the enforcement of 
legislation, starting with Ex parte Young57 and directly proceeding to what 
today is referred to as “standing” cases (Terrace v. Thompson,58 Frothingham 
v. Mellon,59 and Buchanan v. Warley60).  The next principal case is Barker 
Painting Co. v. Local No. 734, Brotherhood of Painters,61 an obscure two-
paragraph Holmes opinion denying that courts have any general warrant to 
discourse on matters beyond the immediate controversy.  The note cases 
following Barker include Lord v. Veazie62 and Chicago & Grand Trunk 
Railway Co. v. Wellman63 (no jurisdiction over feigned or collusive cases).  
 
 49. Id. at viii n.1. 
 50. Two decades earlier, Frankfurter served as Legal Adviser to the Bureau of Insular 
Affairs in the War Department under his first mentor, Henry Stimson.  See PARRISH, supra note 
3, at 42.  In that capacity, he successfully defended Governor General of the Philippines, W. 
Cameron Forbes, from charges that he had illegally detained and deported Chinese aliens from 
the islands.  Tiaco v. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 554, 558 (1913).  On the other hand, before leaving 
the War Department, Frankfurter also “drafted a proposal for expanded Filipino participation in 
the islands’ government.” PARRISH, supra note 3, at 45. 
 51. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792). 
 52. 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561 (1864). 
 53. 154 U.S. 447 (1894). 
 54. 279 U.S. 716 (1929). 
 55. 219 U.S. 346 (1911). 
 56. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Chief Justice Jay and Associate Justices (July 18, 
1793), in 3 THE CORRESPONDENCE & PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 1782–1793, at 486, 486–87 
(Henry P. Johnston ed., 1891). 
 57. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
 58. 263 U.S. 197 (1923). 
 59. 262 U.S. 447 (1923). 
 60. 245 U.S. 60 (1917). 
 61. 281 U.S. 462 (1930). 
 62. 49 U.S. (8 How.) 251 (1850). 
 63. 143 U.S. 339 (1892). 
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The next group of cases relate to “mootness” (Hylton v. United States,64 
Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission,65 and 
United States v. Alaska Steamship Co.66).  The case that follows, Fidelity 
National Bank v. Swope, 67 questions whether a state court judgment 
constitutes a “case or controversy” within the meaning of Article III and 
therefore can be reviewed in the U.S. Supreme Court.  It is followed by the text 
of the then-proposed Federal Declaratory Judgment Act and the Brandeis 
opinion casting doubts on its constitutionality (Willing v. Chicago Auditorium 
Ass’n68).  Then arise two cases in which the U.S. Supreme Court dismisses 
appeals because it finds the lower court judgments to be legislative or 
administrative in nature rather than judicial (Postum Cereal Co. v. California 
Fig Nut Co.69 and Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co.70 ), which 
thematically seem better grouped with Swope.  The “case or controversy” 
chapter ends with what today is referred to as the “political question” doctrine 
(Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon71). 
As the chapter heading “Case or Controversy” denotes, this first segment 
of the book is concerned with outlining the constitutional outer limits of the 
circumstances under which Article III courts may adjudicate.  Occasionally, 
Frankfurter and Katz highlight cases taking a relatively expansive view of such 
circumstances,72 but the chapter’s dominant theme is how the circumstances 
for proper adjudication are generally limited.  The federal judicial machinery 
operates only when fed an honest, antagonistic assertion of a vested right, and 
even then only in a form familiar to the courts at Westminster at the turn of the 
eighteenth century.  Frankfurter’s pedagogy reflected a nation’s impatience 
with judicial invalidations of Progressive legislation, most prominently local 
ordinances regulating working conditions and railroad rate regulations.  State 
and local lawmakers needed the latitude to combat the disastrous side effects 
of industrialization, mechanization, and urbanization.  At a time when federal 
judges protected vested rights with an almost religious fervor, Progressives like 
Frankfurter and Brandeis argued for tight constitutional limits on federal 
judicial review. 
Chapter Two covers the phenomenon of “legislative courts”—tribunals 
created by virtue of Congress’s Article I powers, whose judges lacked life 
 
 64. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796). 
 65. 219 U.S. 498 (1911). 
 66. 253 U.S. 113 (1920). 
 67. 274 U.S. 123, 133–35 (1927). 
 68. 277 U.S. 274 (1928). 
 69. 272 U.S. 693 (1927). 
 70. 261 U.S. 428 (1923). 
 71. 223 U.S. 118 (1912). 
 72. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 
498 (1911); Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796). 
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tenure and salary protection.  This chapter primarily consists of two principal 
cases, American Insurance Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton73 and Ex parte Bakelite 
Corp.,74 which validate territorial courts and the court of claims, respectively, 
as exercises of congressional power.  The validity of legislative courts was 
critical to the Progressive movement and to what was about to become the 
New Deal.  A strong chief executive could appoint Progressively-minded 
commissioners to federal agencies, which would have the first pass at 
adjudicating many of the claims arising under their enabling statutes.  Even 
with some limited form of judicial review, the vested rights jurisprudence of 
most federal judges—expressed in large part through the doctrines of liberty of 
contract and substantive due process—could be sidestepped. 
Section One of Chapter Three covers the doctrines that were eventually 
overthrown by Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.75  Swift v. Tyson76 was, of 
course, a principal bogey, along with its unsubtle modern reaffirmation in 
Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab and 
Transfer Co.77  These decisions gave corporations ample cover from populist 
(sometimes redistributionist) state law by invoking diversity jurisdiction.  But 
Frankfurter gave pride of place in his “Judicial Activism Hall of Shame” to the 
opinion by Justice David Brewer delivered for the Court in Western Union 
Telegraph Co. v. Call Publishing Co.78  As Edward A. Purcell, Jr. wrote in 
Brandeis and the Progressive Constitution: Erie, the Judicial Power, and the 
Politics of the Federal Courts in Twentieth-Century America: 
Western Union was classic Brewer.  Asserting the existence of a national 
common law, he held that it governed interstate commerce and that it was 
independent of both Congress and the states.  By recognizing a distinctly 
national common law, moreover, he implied that it reached to the limits of 
national power and established that the Supreme Court of the United States 
was its authoritative voice. 79 
Such expansion of federal judicial power, at the cost of Congress and the 
states, was the worst of all worlds for advocates of social and industrial 
reforms. 
Section Two of Chapter Three contains cases that illustrate the reverse of 
what eventually became Erie—that is, the proposition that Congress and the 
 
 73. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828). 
 74. 279 U.S. 438 (1929). 
 75. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 76. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
 77. 276 U.S. 518 (1928). 
 78. 181 U.S. 92 (1901). 
 79. EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE 
JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY 
AMERICA 54–55 (2000). 
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federal courts had the power to fashion rules of procedure in cases governed by 
state liability rules.  Section Three, Chapter Three, covers cases that insist 
federal distinctions between law and equity would be applied to diversity cases 
in states that abolished such distinctions.  A quotation from one such case, 
written by Justice Brewer, typifies the idea: “It is well settled that the 
jurisdiction of the Federal courts, sitting as courts of equity, is neither enlarged 
nor diminished by state legislation.”80  In a number of these cases, this meant 
refusing equitable relief for what was deemed nothing more than a legal 
claim.81 
Chapter Four covers “Jurisdiction of District Courts.”  Section One is 
devoted to diversity, including the operation of the “assignee clause,”82 the 
requirement of complete diversity,83 the reach of “ancillary jurisdiction,”84 
corporate citizenship,85 and the anti-collusion clause.86  Section One concludes 
with the problem of shareholder derivative suits brought for the purpose of 
creating diversity that would not otherwise exist (Hawes v. Oakland87 and City 
of Chicago v. Mills88) and a couple of bankruptcy receivership cases. 
Section Two, covering federal question jurisdiction, of course includes 
Osborn v. Bank of the United States89 (federal question merely need be an 
ingredient of cause of action) and Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Mottley90 
(well-pleaded complaint rule).  Interestingly, it also includes Ex parte Young,91 
which held that the question of whether rates were confiscatory under 
substantive due process, and the question of whether penalties for violation of 
those rates were so draconian as to deny procedural due process, both arose 
under federal law.  The casebook editors include the Court’s extended 
discussion of the Eleventh Amendment question and a relatively full version of 
Justice Harlan’s dissent.92  Following Ex parte Young, the editors reprint the 
full text of 28 U.S.C. § 380, which prohibited federal injunctions against state 
officer enforcement of state statutes except by a three-judge court.93  The 
 
 80. Mississippi Mills v. Cohn, 150 U.S. 202, 204 (1893). 
 81. See, e.g., Thompson v. R.R. Cos., 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 134 (1867); Bennett v. Butterworth, 
52 U.S. (11 How.) 669, 676 (1850). 
 82. See, e.g., Sowell v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 268 U.S. 449 (1925); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 
How.) 441 (1850). 
 83. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). 
 84. Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921). 
 85. Covington Drawbridge Co. v. Shepherd, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 227 (1857). 
 86. Miller & Lux Inc. v. E. Side Canal & Irrigation Co., 211 U.S. 293 (1908). 
 87. 104 U.S. 450 (1881). 
 88. 204 U.S. 321 (1907). 
 89. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824). 
 90. 211 U.S. 149, 153 (1908). 
 91. 209 U.S. 123, 144–45 (1908). 
 92. FRANKFURTER & KATZ, supra note 47, at 324–29, 331–34. 
 93. Id. at 334–36. 
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editors’ hostility toward Young is evident, as such injunctions formed a major 
impediment to the Progressive cause.  After three cases dealing with the 
procedure of three-judge courts, the editors put Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line 
Co.,94 in which the Court reversed federal circuit court decrees enjoining 
enforcement of rates on the ground that the plaintiff railroad was required to 
make use of an appeal to the state supreme court before petitioning a federal 
court of equity.  Placement of Prentis in the chapter on federal question 
jurisdiction implies that the ruling was jurisdictional, but Justice Holmes cites 
“comity and convenience,”95 which suggests that Prentis is instead an early 
form of abstention.  Section Two concludes with Siler v. Louisville & 
Nashville Railroad96 (pendent jurisdiction) and that logical tour de force Home 
Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. City of Los Angeles97 (act of state official 
abusing authority constitutes state action for Fourteenth Amendment purposes, 
despite Young’s holding that the official is not the “state” for Eleventh 
Amendment purposes).  Finally, a footnote on page 388 seems to foreshadow 
the abstention doctrine that Frankfurter himself would deliver for the Court 
twelve years later in Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co.98 
With one possible exception, Sections Three through Seven of Chapter 
Four cover unremarkable technical ground.  Section Three contains seventy-
seven pages of removal cases, including the fussiest of procedural details about 
removal and remand procedure—nothing with any political overtones.  Section 
Four covers the probate and domestic relations doctrine, and Sections Six and 
Seven cover jurisdictional amount and venue, respectively. 
Section Five, on federal habeas corpus, rates only two principal cases, but 
they are good ones.  In re Neagle99 was the Wild West tale of a scorned 
couple’s attempt to assassinate Justice Stephen Field.  In the summer of 1888, 
while riding circuit in California, Justice Field sat in judgment on a case 
impugning the validity of the marriage of Mr. and Mrs. David S. Terry.100  The 
Terrys took very great exception to the court’s proceeding, accusing Field of 
 
 94. 211 U.S. 210, 229–230 (1908). 
 95. Id. at 229. 
 96. 213 U.S. 175, 191 (1909). 
 97. 227 U.S. 278, 288–89, 293 (1913). 
 98. 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941).  The footnote stated in part: 
Consider to what extent the decision [Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 279 
U.S. 159 (1929), another case disallowing an injunction where appeal within the state 
court system could have been had] was influenced by the fact that the case involved the 
construction of difficult statutes and contracts not theretofore passed upon by the state 
courts.  Cf. Railroad Commission v. Los Angeles Railway Corporation, 280 U.S. 145 
(1929). 
FRANKFURTER & KATZ, supra note 3, at 388 n.1. 
 99. 135 U.S. 1 (1890). 
 100. Id. at 42–43. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2009] FEDERAL JURISDICTION ACCORDING TO PROFESSOR FRANKFURTER 789 
having been “bought.”101  After creating such a courtroom commotion that 
they were both imprisoned for contempt, the Terrys quite publicly vowed they 
would kill Field.102  The next summer, Justice Field returned to California on 
official business.103  It was fully expected that the Terrys would attempt to 
harm the judge, and one Neagle was assigned to protect him.104  The Terrys 
managed to find their way into a railroad dining car in which Justice Field was 
having breakfast, and they made their move.105  Neagle foiled the assassination 
attempt by shooting David S. Terry dead.106  For reasons not explained in the 
opinion, the San Joaquin County Sheriff took custody of Neagle, who 
petitioned the federal court for his release.107  Unsurprisingly, the federal 
circuit court granted the writ, and the United States Supreme Court, Justice 
Field recusing himself, affirmed.108 
The other habeas case was Moore v. Dempsey,109 which grew out of an 
attack in September 1919 on a black church in Arkansas.  A white man was 
killed in the ensuing violence, and five black men were arrested and charged 
with his murder.110  A lynch mob showed up at the jail, but they were turned 
back by a variety of white officials with a promise that the five would be 
executed in accordance with the law.111  The ensuing trial was a farce, lasting 
only forty-five minutes, with five minutes of jury deliberations before 
returning verdicts of first-degree murder.112  Black witnesses were “whipped 
and tortured until they would say what was wanted,” Justice Holmes wrote for 
the majority.113  “The Court and neighborhood were thronged with an adverse 
crowd that threatened the most dangerous consequences to anyone interfering 
with the desired result.”114  Holmes held that the district court should not have 
dismissed the writ upon demurrer, but instead should have examined the 
petitioners’ factual allegations for itself, given that, if the allegations had been 
true, they would have rendered “the trial absolutely void.”115 
 
 101. Id. at 44–45. 
 102. Id. at 45–46. 
 103. See id. at 52. 
 104. Neagle, 135 U.S. at 52. 
 105. Id. at 52–53. 
 106. Id. at 53. 
 107. Id. at 3–6. 
 108. Id. at 7, 76.  The decision to affirm was not unanimous.  Justice Lamar and Chief Justice 
Fuller dissented on federalism grounds.  See id. at 76–77. 
 109. 261 U.S. 86 (1923). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 88–89. 
 112. Id. at 89. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Moore, 261 U.S. 86, 89. 
 115. Id. at 92. 
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Chapter Five is titled “Concurrent Jurisdiction of State and Federal 
Courts.”  It is a surprisingly116 slender thirty-six pages.  The chapter leads off 
with the Second Employers’ Liability Cases,117 holding that a state court could 
properly enforce a federal employer liability statute.  Minneapolis & St. Louis 
Railroad v. Bombolis118 is next, holding that the mere presence of a federal 
statutory cause of action did not mean the Seventh Amendment’s requirement 
of jury unanimity applied.  The remainder of the chapter’s contents deal with 
what is modernly referred to as the “Anti-Injunction Act.”119  Kline v. Burke 
Construction Co.120 reiterated the principle that federal courts acting in 
personam may not enjoin parallel proceedings in state court.  In Lion Bonding 
& Surety Co. v. Karatz,121 Justice Brandeis held that if a state court acting in 
rem takes possession of the subject property first, it ousts all other courts, 
including federal courts, of jurisdiction.  After a lengthy opinion in a case 
involving counsel misconduct (Harkin v. Brundage122), the chapter closes with 
Wells Fargo & Co. v. Taylor,123 in which the Court held that the suit sub judice 
was not truly “one to stay proceedings in a state court.”124 
Chapter Six, “Jurisdiction of Circuit Courts of Appeal,” is even thinner 
than the previous one.  There is a Brandeis opinion in a Prohibition Act case 
interpreting the final judgment rule (Cogen v. United States125) and a Learned 
Hand opinion, Miller v. Maryland Casualty Co.,126 refusing to exercise 
appellate review over a jury verdict alleged to have been for a grossly 
insufficient amount of damages. 
The remainder of the book is devoted to the jurisdiction of the United 
States Supreme Court.  Chapter Seven, “Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court,” very deliberately leads off with Ex parte McCardle,127 immediately 
and dramatically demonstrating congressional control over that appellate 
jurisdiction, even when such control was exercised for the most overtly 
political of reasons.  This principle was most congenial to Frankfurter’s 
agenda, which was to enable the insulation of congressional reforms from 
conservative federal judges generally, and especially the “Four Horsemen” 
 
 116. Surprising, given the incredible range of problems that can arise when two courts have 
jurisdiction over the same subject matter. 
 117. 223 U.S. 1, 59 (1912). 
 118. 241 U.S. 211, 217, 221–22 (1916). 
 119. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2000). 
 120. 260 U.S. 226, 235 (1922). 
 121. 262 U.S. 77, 88–89 (1923). 
 122. 276 U.S. 36 (1928). 
 123. 254 U.S. 175 (1920). 
 124. Id. at 186. 
 125. 278 U.S. 221 (1929). 
 126. 40 F.2d 463, 464 (2d Cir. 1930). 
 127. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513–14 (1869). 
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(McReynolds, Butler, Van Devanter, and Sutherland).  Then, after three 
opinions on the technical propriety of mandamus, the chapter launches into the 
subject of reviewing state court decisions.  Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee128 is of 
course first.  It is perhaps significant  that Justice Johnson’s concurrence is 
reprinted extensively, emphasizing that the Supreme Court has power only 
over the people and subject matter involved in the lawsuit, and not over the 
state court itself.  If Justice Johnson’s separate opinion was not a sufficient 
reply to Justice Story’s exertion of federal judicial power in Martin, Murdock 
v. City of Memphis129 provided further rejoinder.  State courts could be the only 
authoritative expositors of state law. 
Outside of Martin and Murdock, the most important cases in this section 
are Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant,130 King Manufacturing Co. v. 
City Council of Augusta,131 Cuyahoga River Power Co. v. Northern Realty 
Co.,132 and Broad River Power Co. v. South Carolina.133  Each one was an 
important platform for Frankfurter’s remonstrance against federal interference 
with state economic reforms.  In Dahnke-Walker, the majority held that the 
case was properly before the Court on a writ of error.134  The state court had 
upheld a Kentucky statute placing conditions on out-of-state corporations 
doing business in the state.  Justice Brandeis (the Kentuckian) dissented, 
arguing that the Court had construed the jurisdictional statute far too liberally; 
this sort of case could be heard only on writ of certiorari.135  King 
Manufacturing involved a municipal ordinance fixing utility rates.136  The 
question was whether such ordinance constituted a “state statute” within the 
meaning of the jurisdictional statute.137  The majority held that it did, though it 
upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance on the merits.138  Justices 
Brandeis and Holmes dissented, again arguing that such a case could be raised 
only on writ of certiorari, and not as a matter of right pursuant to a writ of 
error.139  Cuyahoga River Power was dismissed for want of jurisdiction 
because of the presence of an independent and adequate state ground.140  The 
same occurred with Broad River Power, although the disposition on rehearing 
 
 128. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). 
 129. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875). 
 130. 257 U.S. 282 (1921). 
 131. 277 U.S. 100 (1928). 
 132. 244 U.S. 300 (1917). 
 133. 281 U.S. 537, aff’d on reh’g, 282 U.S. 187 (1930). 
 134. Dahnke-Walker, 257 U.S. 282, 290. 
 135. Id. at 293 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 136. King Mfg. Co. v. City Council, 277 U.S. 100, 101 (1928). 
 137. Id. at 102. 
 138. Id. at 114–15. 
 139. Id. at 116 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 140. Cuyahoga River Power Co. v. N. Realty Co., 244 U.S. 300, 304 (1917). 
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clearly revealed the fault lines on the Court.141  The South Carolina Supreme 
Court had ordered the utility to resume operation of a particular line in 
Columbia.142  The utility claimed that it would lose money if it were forced to 
do so, and that such losses would constitute a deprivation of property without 
due process.  The Four Horsemen were willing to dismiss for want of 
jurisdiction only after examining the merits, which revealed a shaky factual 
basis for the constitutional claim.143  Holmes, Brandeis, Stone, and the Chief 
Justice stood by the Court’s original dismissal,144 which purportedly had not 
inquired into the strength of the merits, but rather only determined that the 
judgment was supported by a state ground that was “substantial.”145  In each of 
these four cases, there was no mistaking the editors’ normative take.  
Businesses challenging reform measures in state court could not be given an 
automatic appeal to the Supreme Court.  If they could demonstrate a true 
likelihood of constitutional violation, the Court could always review by way of 
certiorari. 
For the sake of completeness, Chapter Eight covers the original jurisdiction 
of the Supreme Court.  The first case is Marbury v. Madison.146  To the 
uninitiated reader, the case’s significance in American jurisprudence would be 
completely unapparent.  The opinion was edited down to two and a half pages.  
The facts were compressed into a single paragraph.  The excerpt ends with 
“and it becomes necessary to enquire whether a jurisdiction, so conferred, can 
be exercised. . . . The rule must be discharged.”147  The entire discussion of 
judicial review is missing.  The case is in the book for a single purpose, which 
is to illustrate the historic difference between original and appellate 
jurisdiction.  There is virtually no mention of Marbury anywhere else in the 
book. 
It is certainly true that the majesty of Marbury’s dicta does not match its 
doctrinal reality.  “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is” connotes a false exclusivity.  It also 
suggests a license to discourse on the law at will.  But Marbury can just as well 
stand for the proposition that constitutional adjudication is warranted only as a 
last resort, when a claim of vested rights runs headlong into an otherwise valid 
legislative enactment, and there is no other way to resolve the claim.  In that 
 
 141. See Broad River Power Co. v. South Carolina (Broad River II), 282 U.S. 187, 192–93 
(1930). 
 142. Broad River Power Co. v. South Carolina (Broad River I), 281 U.S. 537, 539 (1930). 
 143. See Broad River II, 282 U.S. at 192–93. 
 144. Id. at 193. 
 145. Broad River I, 281 U.S. at 548. 
 146. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 147. FRANKFURTER & KATZ, supra note 47, at 692. 
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light, Frankfurter’s choice to reduce Marbury to a technical apercu on original 
jurisdiction is remarkable. 
Only one other case merits mention.  Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.148 
was a bill in equity filed by the State of Georgia in the United States Supreme 
Court, seeking “to enjoin the defendant Copper Companies from discharging 
noxious gas from their works in Tennessee” into Georgia airspace.  Holmes 
spoke for the majority, granting the injunction, and placing states on a quite 
different footing (standing?) than private litigants, at least for certain 
purposes.149  “The case has been argued largely as if it were one between two 
private parties; but it is not,” Holmes wrote.150  “The very elements that would 
be relied upon in a suit between fellow-citizens as a ground for equitable relief 
are wanting here.  The State owns very little of the [affected] territory . . . . 
This is a suit by a State for an injury to it in its capacity of quasi-sovereign.”151  
Frankfurter could see the structural importance of this case.  State sovereignty 
did not only mean immunity from suit or from certain types of federal 
legislation; it meant special privileges as a plaintiff in a federal court of equity.  
Justice Stevens finally seized on this insight exactly a century later in 
Massachusetts v. EPA.152 
III 
To my eye, three things stand out about the Frankfurter and Katz text.  
First, it is as much a book about political theory—and only secondarily about 
procedure—as a writer could get away with under the circumstances.  Most of 
the material is about structural protection for the decision-making authority of 
Congress, state legislatures, administrative agencies, or state courts, rather than 
about what strategic advantages counsel might secure, or about the protection 
of the integrity of adjudication for the benefit of litigants.  It is hard to imagine 
a pedagogic text much more overtly aimed at political theory and less at the 
timeless principles of common law adjudication, given the Langdellian 
orthodoxy that still largely held sway at Harvard in 1931.153 
Second, the book has a readily discernable normative take.  In a day when 
“notes and questions” were not generally available to rebut the rhetoric of a 
 
 148. 206 U.S. 230, 236 (1907). 
 149. See id. at 237. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. 549 U.S. 497, 518–19 (2007). 
 153. It is true that Frankfurter’s course on “Public Utilities” was famously unstructured.  “We 
were not learning law,” Parrish quotes one student as saying.  PARRISH, supra note 3, at 66.  
“[T]hat was not our business.  We were gaining some measure of understanding of law that both 
reflected and shaped a nation’s growth—some understanding of its method and some appreciation 
of its content.”  Id.  Another student devoted a poem to the course: “You learn no law in Public 
U/That is its fascination/But Felix gives a point of view/And pleasant conversation.”  Id. at 65. 
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wrongheaded majority opinion, the editors made their views known by the 
selection of certain opinions and by giving full exposition to certain dissents, a 
very large number of which were written by Holmes or Brandeis.  The book is 
fair, in the sense that the big cases cutting against Frankfurter’s view of federal 
judicial restraint are generally included (Marbury aside).  But one is left with 
few doubts about what that view is. 
Third, it is clearly a book about the federal judiciary’s place in the 
structure of American constitutional government.  By volume and emphasis, 
the book gives pride of place to separation of powers over federalism, but 
whatever order they are given, they are the two structural principles around 
which the text coheres. 
Each of these three features raises an issue for the future of the Federal 
Courts curriculum.  Should the course primarily be one about political theory, 
or should it primarily be one about federal court procedure?  Most of our 
students, after all, are not going on to be academics or statesmen.  This issue is 
a microcosm of a larger dilemma that American law schools have faced for a 
long time: practice or theory?  At the top schools, at least, theory has won the 
day.  This is hardly the place to settle such a huge question.  Suffice it to say 
that treating the Federal Courts course as primarily about American political 
theory ought to be no more controversial than teaching criminal law out of the 
Model Penal Code or teaching tort law as a vehicle for social control.  Of 
course, theory and practice are not always mutually exclusive, and surely there 
is room in the course for some discussion of procedural rules that have little 
structural import.  But if there is to be a serious attempt to examine the 
structure of American government systematically—even through the eyes of 
federal courts—it is hard to see room for such  doctrines as venue, court of 
appeals jurisdiction, the Tidewater problem, joinder, service of process, 
interpleader, interdistrict transfer, and attorney’s fees.  Indeed, the complexity 
of recent official immunity and federal habeas corpus doctrine threatens to 
overshadow their structural importance.  And it has been decades since an 
Anti-Injunction Act case has had important political overtones. 
On the matter of normative take, I see room for individuality.  My personal 
experience is that most students (at Hastings, at least) are conventionally left-
liberal and therefore are sympathetic to criticism of the restrictive justiciability, 
procedural due process, and habeas corpus decisions of the Burger, Rehnquist, 
and Roberts Courts.  They of course expect to be clear on where the agreed-
upon doctrine ends and criticism begins, and they also want to know the best 
arguments supporting these restrictive doctrines.  But they tend to grow 
impatient with what they correctly perceive as an artificial effort to give 
perfectly equal time to the supporting and detracting arguments.  At the other 
end of the spectrum, a very heavy-handed approach will stifle legitimate 
discussion and questions from all but the most intrepid or confrontational 
students.  One possibility would be to have a meticulously balanced text with a 
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clearly opinionated instructor, or vice-versa.  In the end, so long as there is full 
disclosure, almost any of these approaches can work. 
Finally, what of my observation that the Frankfurter and Katz book is 
about the place of the federal courts in American constitutional government?  
If the course is essentially one about federal judicial power vis-à-vis the other 
branches and the states, then perhaps it should be one part of a three-semester 
course in Constitutional Law (which might be renamed something like 
American Constitutional Government).  Much of the Federal Courts 
curriculum is already taught in the “structural” part of Constitutional Law, but 
not in much depth.  Better to break out those issues directly pertaining to 
federal judicial power and put them in a separate semester.  But it should be 
made clear that federal judicial power is part and parcel of a larger system of 
decision-making allocation under the Constitution. 
So I conclude this essay with a proposal.  Turn the two-semester course in 
Constitutional Law into a three-semester course.  The first semester would 
cover the federal judicial power, including the foundation of judicial review, 
subject matter jurisdiction (including supplemental jurisdiction and removal), 
the justiciability doctrines, jurisdiction stripping, federal common law, the 
Eleventh Amendment, concurrent jurisdiction (featuring abstention), and 
independent and adequate state grounds.  As suggested above, I would leave 
topics like joinder, venue, interpleader, intervention, service of process, and 
interdistrict transfer to courses like Civil Procedure and Complex Litigation.  (I 
would also leave territorial jurisdiction to Civil Procedure, as it has fewer 
structural implications than subject matter jurisdiction.)  The second semester 
would include congressional power, executive power, preemption of state law, 
the relationship of the Commerce Clause to federalism, and the relationship of 
congressional power to executive power with respect to foreign affairs.  The 
third semester, of course, would cover individual liberties.154  I would then 
eliminate “Federal Courts” as a separate course, leaving such topics as Section 
1983 and habeas corpus to a course on civil rights. 
I do not claim that this proposal is in some way mandated by the 
Frankfurter and Katz text, or that the idea of making the course cohere around 
“federal judicial power in constitutional government” is original to Frankfurter 
and Katz.  Every Federal Courts casebook on the market today displays that 
basic emphasis (although many of those books contain topics that are more 
procedural than politically structural).  I do claim that portraying the federal 
judicial power not in isolation, but explicitly as one component of an endlessly 
complex and largely fluid system of constitutional government, is the format 
that would do the greatest justice to the Frankfurterian idea. 
 
 154. I realize my proposal is unlikely to be adopted because it entails pushing “individual 
rights” to the second year of law school. 
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